[Child of God]: 416.Reflections.On Spinoza and Miracles

In all fairness to Spinoza, one cannot fairly criticize his notion of miracles from a Christian standpoint when his concept of God is taken into consideration. Based on his pantheistic notions of God, Spinoza believed God had no personality and herein lay the problem for the Christian. If Spinoza had merely proposed a personality contrary to popular Christian belief, one would be able to criticize and refute based on similar grounds. However, in denying the existence of a personality for God, he eradicates any possibility of a personal, intimate relationship which is so central in (at least, contemporary) Christianity. If one is to criticize any portion of Spinoza’s work, it must be taken in the original context, and to engage him otherwise, one runs the risk of de-contextualizing his arguments from their intended meaning. Such is not the risk I wish to take here, and as such, to criticize Spinoza’s view on miracles I will also be required a minimal critique on of his notion of God.

In the foremost, I reject his notion of God. Though the notion will not here be elaborated, such a statement is needed before continuing. Rather, I accept the Christian notion of God and of the salvation and relationship offered through Christ Jesus.

With those statements done, let us turn to the matter at hand. Spinoza’s view of miracles can, for the most part, be accepted within a Christian understanding of God, if de-contextualized from his notion of the divine. I would have to, for the most part, agree with Spinoza’s argument that “the term ‘miracle’. . . means nothing but a work whose natural cause we cannot explain by the example of another customary thing” (Frank et al. Par. 13, 329). My personal belief is that the natural laws are merely man’s vocalization of the “how” and “why” in God’s creation. Natural laws explain how, and to some extent why, nature works the way it does. Here is where I disagree with Spinoza; though I may agree with this conclusion, I do not agree with the means in which he arrived to it (Ibid.). Specifically, it is his second premise from which I find error, but again this draws back to the different conceptions of God. While Spinoza conceives God as merely a “Divine Intelligence,” I, as a Christian, conceive of God as an individual, singular entity which has Divine Intelligence. As such, in Spinoza’s concept of God it would not be erroneous to state that the laws “extend to all things conceived by the divine intellect itself” (Ibid), since God is not separate from His creation but rather one with it. However, to take that statement into consideration within the Christian notion of God, without de-contextualizing Spinoza, the Christian finds that statement to be quite erroneous.

Within the Christian notion of Creator vs. creation this argument finds rebuke. To hold that an external, omnipotent, omniscient Creator is bound by the same laws as that which He has created is fallacious: to have an omnipotent being bound by anything removes its omnipotence. Should God be one with nature, it could only be that He would be bound by the same laws of nature. However, being external to nature, He is also external to the laws of nature. While He may still operate within these laws, He is still not bound by them. Charles C. Adams unknowingly articulates this distinction in The Christian Educators Journal when he asks “Could it be that we begin to see God as defined by these rational qualities rather than seeing these qualities as rational ways that He chooses for revealing himself to men?” (Adams,19). While Spinoza understands God by rational qualities in the form of natural laws, Christians, see natural laws as the means in which God reveals His personality to man. Again, we can see how the root of the disagreement lies in Spinoza’s view of God as compared to the Christian view of God.

Interestingly, I do agree with the first half of his argument in paragraph 16, where he states that “from miracles we understand neither God’s essence, nor his existence, nor his providence.” (Frank et al. 32) Although I do not agree with the remainder of the statement, the first portion I would dare to deem correct. Miracles do not aid us in better understanding God’s essence or existence. Turning water into wine, or hearing words spoken from a fiery bush do not reveal “what” God is or “how” God is who He is, or even that He is the God with the attributes given to Him by Christians. In fact, miracles often confuse us more about the “what” of God’s essence and the “how” of His existence. Miracles also reveal nothing about His providence. It is not until the miracle is explained in some divine fashion is it, sometimes, understood in relation to His providence. It was not until Christ explained to His disciples did they understand why He had to die.

Rather, I would argue that from miracles we gain understanding of God’s personality. Here again, Spinoza and I disagree due to the difference concepts of God. In the Christian concept of a loving, forgiving, nurturing, faithful, etc., God, miracles reveal or confirm one or many aspects of this personality. Part of this understanding of God’s personality is the notion of Divine Purpose for creation. Donald M. MacKay perhaps said it best in declaring that:

"The biblical claim is that wherever God ‘[brought] into being’ an event which we call a miracle, whether or not it broke with scientific precedent, he did it because in the over-all pattern of his drama it made more sense at that point: because his total plan and purpose for our world would have been less coherent had it not occurred in the way it did . . . . biblical theism insists that any breaks with scientific precedent that have occurred were but a further expression of the same faithfulness to a coherent over-all purpose which is normally expressed in the day-to-day reliability of nature" (MacKay, 64).

Just because we do not understand how a miracle works does not mean it is contrary to natural law, it merely means we have yet to discover that aspect of a law.

Now, here I may run into some opposition from conventional Christians who would argue that a miracle is precisely a miracle because it cannot be explained by science and such laws. I admit that here I tread dangerous water. My response is two-fold, with the first part relying heavily on what could be referred to as a form of metaphysical causality. Love is rarely thought of as a force, but rather an emotion. However, it would be wrong for the Christian to hold such a belief, since love is capable of bringing about action. Love in itself can be an action. The resurrection and ascension of Christ is the ultimate example of this. These two events seem to defy every nature law currently known to man in some form or another, yet Christians hold it to be true. It is a miracle. But how could this miracle happen? Didn’t we just say that miracles are not contrary to natural laws? How could resurrection of the dead not be seen as contrary to natural law? Here, I draw on C.S. Lewis where he asks in regards to natural laws “Don’t they all tell you what will happen provided there’s no interference?” (Lewis, 73) He goes on further to say that

"if there was anything outside Nature, and if it interfered – then the events which the scientist expected wouldn’t follow. That would be what we call a miracle. In one sense it wouldn’t break the laws of Nature. The laws tell you what will happen if nothing interferes. They can’t tell you whether something is going to interfere." (Lewis, 74)

This “something” that Lewis is referring to is what I would dare claim to be the love of God. Again, I may be on shaking grounds with philosophers and theologians like on this statement, but I would argue that the love of God for His creation was the reason Jesus was sent to earth to die in the first place. It was out of love that Jesus willingly gave His life. And, I would argue, it was because of that love that He rose from the dead. It was that love which overcame death, which spawned the miracle. Love is Lewis’ “something” that interferes. It doesn’t break the laws of nature, because the laws of nature don’t allow for the force of love in their equations. Because of love, extraordinary events and changes occur in people and circumstances alike. It is a force so strong that it compels God to act (even if that force is a part of Him, it still compels Him to act).

Returning now to this idea of metaphysical causality, the force of love (a metaphysical concept) could be seen as the cause for such events to take place. And until love can be factored in to natural laws, miracles cannot be fully explained. However, if it were possible to somehow factor the force of love into these laws, I would argue that miracles would find their explanation in the natural laws. This leads into the second part of my answer, that being that I very much doubt that love could, nor would ever be factored into natural laws. The force of love is seen as too much of a metaphysical and not enough of an empirical concept. It is not quantifiable, at least not in any form currently known. Until we are somehow able to factor this force, which is external to nature, into our current natural laws, we will continue to see miracles as alien to both nature and it’s laws.

Have I side-stepped the question though? When it comes down to it, will an event still be considered a miracle even if we understand how it happens? Perhaps, but to fully understand natural laws we need to factor in the force of love. Similar, yet contrary to Spinoza’s theory, I do believe miracles occur within natural laws. Not because God and nature are one and thus natural laws are divine decrees, but rather because we do not fully understand the natural laws the Creator placed within the creation. Once these laws are fully understood, through factoring in the force of love, miracles will be able to be explained through them. Can a miracle then still be considered a miracle? Perhaps not. Once miracles are fully understood based on these criteria, they may be called Acts of Love, rather than miracles.